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Abstract
Deep Neural Networks, despite their great suc-
cess in diverse domains, are provably sensi-
tive to small perturbations on correctly clas-
sified examples and lead to erroneous predic-
tions. Recently, it was proposed that this be-
havior can be combatted by optimizing the
worst case loss function over all possible sub-
stitutions of training examples. However, this
can be prone to weighing unlikely substitu-
tions higher, limiting the accuracy gain. In this
paper, we study adversarial robustness through
randomized perturbations, which has two im-
mediate advantages: (1) by ensuring that sub-
stitution likelihood is weighted by the proxim-
ity to the original word, we circumvent opti-
mizing the worst case guarantees and achieve
performance gains; and (2) the calibrated ran-
domness imparts differentially-private model
training, which additionally improves robust-
ness against adversarial attacks on the model
outputs. Our approach uses a novel density-
based mechanism based on truncated Gumbel
noise, which ensures training on substitutions
of both rare and dense words in the vocabu-
lary while maintaining semantic similarity for
model robustness.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have found ap-
plications within multiple domains: from com-
puter vision (Krizhevsky et al., 2012), and nat-
ural language processing (Mikolov et al., 2013),
to robotics (Kober et al., 2013) and self-driving
cars (Bojarski et al., 2016). However, DNNs have
been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial exam-
ples. These are small perturbations of examples
that are correctly classified by well-trained mod-
els but incorrectly classified in the target (Szegedy
et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2014).
A few approaches have been proposed to defend
against such adversarial attacks. One of the most
widely used methods is adding the adversarial ex-
amples to the original training set and retraining the
model. On most kinds of perturbations, such aug-
mented training approach has achieved improved
robustness without harming accuracy on the orig-
inal testing sets (Jia and Liang, 2017; Iyyer et al.,
2018; Ribeiro et al., 2018; Belinkov and Bisk, 2017;
Ebrahimi et al., 2017). However, this often leads to
the augmented neural network over-fitting to the ad-
ditional data (Matyasko and Chau, 2017), but fail-
ing to perform robustly against other types of adver-
sarial examples (Jia and Liang, 2017; Belinkov and
Bisk, 2017). Recently, certified defences have been
adopted in the computer vision domain (Lecuyer
et al., 2019; Dvijotham et al., 2018; Gowal et al.,
2018). To defend against perturbations on text data,
the Interval Bounded Propagation (IBP) approach
was proposed by (Jia et al., 2019) to minimize the
upper bound on the worst-case loss that word sub-
stitutions can induce during the training procedure.
In this paper, we propose a new approach to
generate adversarial examples via word substitu-
tions in textual analysis. Our approach is based on
randomized mechanisms satisfying Metric Differ-
ential Privacy (dχ-privacy (Andre´s et al., 2013)) –
a variant of Differential privacy (DP). DP was pro-
posed by (Dwork et al., 2006) and has been estab-
lished as a de facto standard for privacy-preserving
data analysis. It mathematically guarantees, given
a privacy parameter , that an adversary observ-
ing separate outputs of computations over adjacent
databases (described by a Hamming distance) will
make essentially the same inference. As opposed
to standard DP, with dχ-privacy, the guarantees
are scaled by a (different) distance metric between
adjacent databases, and privacy preserving noise
is sampled from a multivariate (Laplacian) distri-
bution. The distances are over a metric space as
defined by word embeddings such as GloVe (Pen-
nington et al., 2014) or fastText (Bojanowski et al.,
ar
X
iv
:2
00
9.
12
71
8v
1 
 [c
s.L
G]
  2
7 S
ep
 20
20
2017), while the data points are vector represen-
tions of the words. The mechanism assigns higher
substitution probability, based on the noise added,
to words closer to the original one than those fur-
ther away. The private text mechanisms proposed
by (Fernandes et al., 2019) and (Feyisetan et al.,
2019, 2020) work using this approach.
However, for words with embedding vectors
in dense areas, the existing multivariate Laplace
mechanisms fail to distinguish nearer (i.e., more
relevant) words from other close but less relevant
words. As a result, for a given value of the privacy
parameter , an irrelevant word could have a similar
substitution probability as a relevant word. We pro-
pose a new metric-DP mechanism called the trun-
cated Gumbel perturbation mechanism to allow a
smaller range of nearby words considered than the
multivariate Laplace mechanism. The new mecha-
nism samples a k value from a truncated Poisson
distribution as substitution candidates before pertur-
bation, hence words nearby with irrelevant mean-
ings are disregarded. This better preserves word
semantics and improves utility of models trained
on perturbed datasets in downstream tasks.
In this paper, we investigate the performance of
a well-trained IBP model on classification tasks
when the input text is perturbed by a metric DP
mechanism with different values of  – correspond-
ing to different degrees of semantic preservation.
Motivated by the success of augmented training
with adversarial data such as (Jia and Liang, 2017),
we also add the adversarial examples generated by
the privacy mechanisms to the original training set
while comparing its robustness with IBP.
The contributions of this paper is as follows:
• We propose a novel metric-DP mechanism
called the truncated Gumbel mechanism,
which provides formal privacy guarantees,
and better preserves semantic meanings than
the existing multivariate Laplace mechanisms.
• To the best of our knowledge, we are the first
to leverage metric-DP mechanisms to gener-
ate adversarial examples and study the per-
formance of different adversarial training ap-
proaches at different values of .
• We empirically demonstrate the benefit of the
truncated Gumbel mechanism in preserving
semantics and show that augmented training
performs better than certifiably robust training,
both in clean and adversarial accuracy.
2 Related Work
Privacy Preservation DP (Dwork et al., 2006)
preserves privacy on the output of a computation
by adding noise sampled from a certain distribu-
tion (e.g. Laplace). The magnitude of the noise is
proportional to the sensitivity of the computation,
and controlled by the parameter . We consider
a relaxation of DP, metric DP or dχ-privacy, that
originated in the context of location privacy, where
locations close to the user are assigned higher
probability those far away (Andre´s et al., 2013;
Chatzikokolakis et al., 2013). For text, the corol-
lary to geo-location cooridinates are word vectors
in an embedding space. To preserve privacy, noise
is sampled from a multivariate distribution such as
the multivariate Laplace mechanism in (Fernandes
et al., 2019; Feyisetan et al., 2020) or a hyperbolic
distribution in (Feyisetan et al., 2019).
Adversarial Attacks Deep neural networks are
vulnerable to adversarial examples, where pertur-
bations applied to examples correctly classified by
well-trained models, lead to mis-classification with
significantly high confidence (Szegedy et al., 2013;
Goodfellow et al., 2014). In the text domain, ad-
versarial example generation includes techniques
for extraneous text insertion (Jia and Liang, 2017),
word substitution (Alzantot et al., 2018), paraphras-
ing (Iyyer et al., 2018; Ribeiro et al., 2018), and
character-level noise (Belinkov and Bisk, 2017;
Ebrahimi et al., 2017). In this paper, we generate
adversarial examples by word-level perturbations
without semantic-preservation constraints. Specifi-
cally, randomized perturbations satisfying metric-
DP are employed, with the privacy parameter  con-
trolling semantic similarity during substitutions.
Adversarial Training Augmenting training sets
with adversarial examples is a common way of im-
proving robustness in adversarial training (Szegedy
et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2014). Although
it achieves improved robustness without harming
accuracy on the original testing sets (Jia and Liang,
2017; Iyyer et al., 2018; Ribeiro et al., 2018; Be-
linkov and Bisk, 2017; Ebrahimi et al., 2017), aug-
mented training is still vulnerable when tested on
other adversarial examples (Jia and Liang, 2017;
Belinkov and Bisk, 2017). Certified defences
which provide guarantees of robustness to norm-
bounded attacks have become popular in com-
puter vision (Lecuyer et al., 2019; Dvijotham et al.,
2018; Gowal et al., 2018). For text, the Interval
Bound Propagation (IBP) approach minimizes an
upper bound on the worst-case loss during train-
ing that any combination of word substitutions
can induce (Jia et al., 2019). This requires that
the allowed word substitutions are known a-priori.
In this paper, we study the robustness of an IBP-
trained model on adversarial examples generated
by metric DP mechanisms. Furthermore, we an-
alyze how adding adversarial examples into the
training set can help improve robustness.
Connections between Privacy Preservation and
Adversarial Learning To the best of our knowl-
edge, this paper is the first to propose: perturbing
text with metric-DP mechanisms, and testing the
robustness of adversarial training approaches with
these adversarial examples. Connections between
privacy and adversarial learning have been studied
extensively in the different domains (Pinot et al.,
2019). Two key properties of DP have been lever-
aged to add a noise layer to the network’s architec-
ture to provide guaranteed robustness against adver-
sarial examples (Lecuyer et al., 2019). Similarly,
trade-offs between DP preservation and provable
robustness have been studied by learning private
model parameters first followed by rigorous robust-
ness bound computation (Phan et al., 2019a,b).
3 Technical Preliminaries
We begin with providing some background on
metric Differential Privacy and the multivariate
Laplace mechanism, which is commonly used in
privacy-preserving textual analysis.
Differential Privacy First proposed by (Dwork
et al., 2006), DP provides a strong mathematical
framework for guaranteeing that the output of a
randomized mechanism will remain essentially un-
changed on any two neighboring input databases.
Formally, a randomized mechanism M : X → Y
satisfies (, δ)-DP if for any x, x′ ∈ X that differ
in only one entry, then it holds for all Y ⊆ Y that:
Pr[M(x) ∈ Y ] ≤ ePr[M(x′) ∈ Y ] + δ, (1)
where  > 0 and δ ∈ [0, 1] are parameters that
quantify the strength of the privacy guarantee. If
δ = 0, we say that the mechanism M is -DP.
This definition can be generalized to other met-
rics for capturing dataset proximity depending on
the application, e.g., the Manhattan distance met-
ric used to provide indistinguishability if the indi-
vidual’s registration date differs at most 5 days in
two databases, and the Euclidean distance on the
2-dimensional space used to preserve the user’s lon-
gitude and latitude information (Chatzikokolakis
et al., 2015). In particular, for text data, we adopt
metric Differential Privacy (a.k.a. dχ-privacy), fol-
lowing (Chatzikokolakis et al., 2013; Fernandes
et al., 2019; Feyisetan et al., 2020). In this frame-
work, we ensure that for all y ∈ Y , it holds that:
Pr[M(x) = y] ≤ ed(x,x′)Pr[M(x′) = y], (2)
where the metric d(x, x′) = ‖φ(x)− φ(x′)‖ de-
scribes the Euclidean distance of the word repre-
sentations for x, x′ in some semantic embedding
space like GloVe (Pennington et al., 2014). Under
this definition, the likelihood of a similar output
from the mechanism is weighted in proportion to
distance of the word being substituted.
Multivariate Laplace Mechanism A popular
approach for achieving metric-DP is to use a multi-
variate Laplace Mechanism for high-dimensional
data (Wu et al., 2017; Feyisetan et al., 2020).
Given the embedding vector φ(x) ∈ Rn for each
word in the vocabulary, an n-dimensional noise
κ is sampled following the distribution p(κ) ∝
exp(− ‖κ‖). This variate is obtained by first sam-
pling a uniform vector in the n-dimensional unit
ball and scaling it using a Gamma variate sampled
from Γ(n, 1/). The perturbed word x′ is the near-
est word to φ(x) + κ in the embedding space.
Truncated Poisson Sampling The mechanism
we define in this paper uses random variates sam-
pled from a Poisson distribution, but truncated in
value if it gets too large. We define this density
function below.
Definition 1. Let λ > 0 be a real and a, b be two
integers with 1 ≤ a < b. We say that a random
variable X follows a TruncatedPoisson (λ; a, b)
distribution if the following holds:
Pr(X = k) =

e−λλk
k! if a ≤ k < b
1−∑b−1k=a e−λλkk! if k = b
0 otherwise.
To sample a random variate X following this
distribution, we sample Y ∼ Poisson(λ) and
set X = Y if a ≤ Y < b, and X = b,
otherwise. An important property of such ran-
dom variables is that for all λ > 0, it holds
that Pr(X = b) > e−λ. This follows from
the fact that since 1 ≤ a < b, we can write
Pr(X = b) =
∑∞
k=0
e−λλk
k! −
∑b−1
k=a
e−λλk
k! =
e−λ+
∑a−1
k=1
e−λλk
k! +
∑∞
k=b+1
e−λλk
k! > e
−λ. This
will be useful in our privacy analysis.
Gumbel Distribution Our mechanism uses ran-
dom variates sampled from the Gumbel dis-
tribution, defined over all x ∈ R, us-
ing the cumulative density Gumbel(x;µ, β) =
exp (− exp (−(x− µ)/β)) for µ ∈ R and β > 0.
We write X ∼ Gumbel(0, b) to denote a Gumbel
distributed random sample with µ = 0 and β = b.
Lambert-W Function This is a popular multi-
valued function obtained from the inverse rela-
tion of the function f(w) = wew for any com-
plex valued w. We focus on only the real prin-
cipal branch of this function defined whenever
f(w) ≥ −1, in which we have the asymptotic iden-
tityW (x) = lnx− ln lnx+Θ ( ln lnxlnx ) (see (Hoor-
far and Hassani, 2008)).
4 Overview of our Approach
We now give an overview of approaches discussed
in this paper for defending against adversarial at-
tacks. Given text input x ∈ X , we consider classi-
fication tasks where a model f(x; θ), parametrized
by θ, should predict a label y ∈ Y . For sentiment
classification tasks, the input x is composed of a
string of l words x1, x2, · · · , xl and labelled by
one of the two classes y ∈ {1,−1}, where the
positive sentiment is denoted by 1 while the nega-
tive by −1. For textual entailment tasks, two texts
are given, one is the premise x and the other is
the hypothesis x′, and a label is provided based
on the relationship between the two: y ∈ {0, 1, 2}
denoting the entailment, contradiction or neutral
relationship, respectively. Performance of the clas-
sification model is evaluated by the percentile
of correct predictions inferred on the testing set:∑
xi∈Dtest 1(f(xi; θ) = yi)/|Dtest|, where 1 is an
indicator function equal to 1 if the predicted la-
bel f(xi; θ) is identical to the ground-truth yi, 0
otherwise; |Dtest| represents the size of the test set.
Adversarial Attacks by Word Substitutions
We evaluate the performance of existing certifi-
ably robust trained models when perturbed texts
are provided as inputs. Formally, a word-level per-
turbation is obtained by substituting a given word
xi by another word x˜i in a way that the semantic
similarity between the two is determined by the
leveraged metric DP mechanism. To achieve this,
the additive noise is parametrized by the privacy
parameter : a larger value of  corresponds to less
noise, and vice versa.
For the multivariate Laplace Mechanism
of (Feyisetan et al., 2020), since the noise is scaled
purely as a function of the distance from the orig-
inal word, when  is small, words in the dense re-
gions of the embedding space are prone to getting
substituted with dissimilar words (that are further
away), compared to the words in the sparse region.
This is because in areas where embedding vectors
are densely located, the distance between two ir-
relevant words is commensurate to that between
two words with similar meanings in a sparse re-
gion. Hence, adapting the word-level substitution
to variations in the density of the embedding space
can help boost the utility of models trained on per-
turbed datasets. To do this efficiently (and without
any expensive computation of local sensitivity each
time a substitution is made), we propose a novel
mechanism based on a truncated Gumbel distribu-
tion and prove that it admits metric DP. Instead of
sampling based on the distance from the original
word, this approach samples k candidate substitu-
tions following the Truncated Poisson distribution
and then makes a distance-based calibrated ran-
dom choice from the k − 1-nearest neighbors of
the original word in the embedding space (see Al-
gorithms 1 and 2). We describe this mechanism
in more detail in Section 5, and prove its formal
privacy guarantees in Appendix A.
Learning with Adversarial Examples Moti-
vated by the success of augmented training ap-
proaches when text perturbations happen in the
form of extraneous text insertion (Jia and Liang,
2017), paraphrasing (Iyyer et al., 2018; Ribeiro
et al., 2018), character-level noise (Belinkov and
Bisk, 2017; Ebrahimi et al., 2017), we also inves-
tigate the effectiveness of adding adversarial ex-
amples generated by metric DP mechanisms to the
training set for retraining. Retaining the label of
each sample, we perturb the text four times, during
which every word is perturbed by either the existing
multivariate Laplace Mechanism or the proposed
truncated Gumbel Mechanism.
5 Truncated Gumbel Mechanism
Motivated by the approach proposed by (Durfee
and Rogers, 2019), our density-aware word substi-
tution mechanism uses a Gumbel random variate
for selecting amongst a list of candidate perturba-
Algorithm 1: TRUNCATED-GUMBEL-ARG-MIN
Input :Real vector u = [u1, . . . , um], scale parameter
b > 0, truncation parameter C > 0
1 Sample g1, . . . , gm ∼i.i.d. Gumbel (0, b) truncated
between [−C,C].
2 Compute u′ = [u1 + g1, . . . , um + gm].
3 return arg minu′.
tions (see Algorithm 2). To ensure plausible denia-
bility over the entire vocabulary, the support of the
substitution mechanism must include all the words,
however, limiting the set of candidate substitutions
to only the semantically similar words is necessary
to maintain utility.
We balance this trade-off by first randomly se-
lecting the k nearest neighbors of the original word
using a truncated Poisson variate, with support over
the whole vocabulary (see Step 4). The mean num-
ber of candidates is set to the natural logarithm of
the vocabulary size, to ensure that this number is
neither too small, nor too large. Next, the closest
k−1 words to the original word are obtained (using
a nearest neighbor search) and their distances are
recorded (see Steps 5 and 6). A random choice over
this set is made using Algorithm 1, where the dis-
tances are first noised with Gumbel distributed ran-
dom variates and then the smallest noised distance
determines the new word (see Step 7). The Gumbel
noise is scaled using the privacy parameter  and
the diameter ∆ of the embedding space, and then
clipped using a truncation parameter C > 0. The
process is repeated independently for each word in
the input string.
6 Experimental Results
We evaluate the proposed privacy mechanism, ad-
versarial attacks and the defense approach through
answers to the following questions:
Q1 How does the privacy parameter  affect the
behavior of the perturbation mechanisms on
different text classification tasks?
Q2 Does the proposed truncated Gumbel mecha-
nism lead to a smaller range of word substi-
tutions compared to the Multivariate Laplace
Mechanism?
Q3 How will different adversarial training ap-
proaches, i.e., the IBP approach with certified
robustness and the proposed augmented train-
ing, perform when testing on adversarial ex-
amples derived from metric-DP mechanisms?
6.1 Tasks and Datasets
We evaluate the robustness of models on two
text classification tasks: sentiment analysis on the
IMDb movie review dataset (Maas et al., 2011)
and textual entailment on premise-hypothesis rela-
tion dataset SNLI (Bowman et al., 2015). We use
300-dimensional GloVe vectors for word embed-
ding (Pennington et al., 2014). The statistics of the
two datasets are listed in Table. 1.
Sentiment Analysis In IMDb, each movie re-
view is accompanied with either a positive or neg-
ative label. For the binary classification task, we
implemented the CNN architecture that achieved
the best adversarial attack and certified accuracy
in (Jia et al., 2019).
Textual Entailment In SNLI, each sample is
composed of two sentence: one as the premise and
the other as the hypothesis. The classification task
is to define the relationship as an entailment, contra-
diction, or neutral. Following the implementation
in (Alzantot et al., 2018), only words in hypoth-
esis are allowed to be substituted. Similarly, we
adopted the architecture that outperformed others
in (Jia et al., 2019) for evaluating different adver-
sarial training approaches.
6.2 Compared Approaches
We compare robustness of the following two train-
ing approaches when adversarial examples are gen-
erated using metric-DP perturbation.
Certifiably Robust Trained Approach Interval
Bound Propagation (IBP) was leveraged to mini-
mize the upper bound on the worst-case loss that
any combination of word substitutions can induce.
Specifically, an upper and lower bound on the ac-
tivation of an neuron in each layer is computed
based on the bounds of neurons in previous layers
that connect to it. Bounds for the input layer is
computed based on the smallest axis-aligned box
that contains all the possible word substitutions,
while the upper bound on the loss in the final layer
is combined with the normal cross entropy loss to
optimize the classification performance on the ac-
tual word and any other substitutions. The allowed
substitutions are based on (Alzantot et al., 2018).
Augmented Training we add the adversarial ex-
amples (four times of perturbations per sample)
generated by metric differential privacy mecha-
nisms into the training set and retain the model.
Algorithm 2: Truncated Gumbel Perturbation Mechanism
Input :String x = w1w2 . . . w` ∈ W`, privacy parameter  > 0, word setW .
1 Let ∆ = maxw,w′∈W ‖φ(w)− φ(w′)‖2 be the maximum inter-word distance, ∆0 = minw,w′∈W
w 6=w′
‖φ(w)− φ(w′)‖2 be
the minimum inter-word distance. Set b = 2∆
min{W (2α∆), loge(α∆0)} , where α =
1
3
(
− 2(1+log |W|)
∆0
)
and W denotes
the principal branch of the Lambert-W function.
2 Initialize an empty string x˜.
3 for wi ∈ x do
4 Sample k = TruncatedPoisson (log |W|; 1, |W|).
5 Find the top k closest words to wi inW as u = [u1, u2, . . . , uj , . . . , uk], where u1 = wi.
6 Compute the distances d = [d1, d2, . . . dj , . . . , dk], where dj = ||wi − uj ||2.
7 Set w˜i = uj , where j = TRUNCATED-GUMBEL-ARG-MIN (d, b,∆).
8 Add w˜i to x˜.
9 end
10 Return x˜.
Dataset IMDb SNLI
Task type binary three-class
Training set size 20,000 550,152
Testing set size 1000 10,000
Total word count 11,856,015 4,614,822
Vocabulary size 145,901 49,895
Sentence length 263.46±195.29 8.25±3.20
Table 1: Summary of dataset properties.
6.3 Adversarial Attack Methodology
Following (Alzantot et al., 2018), a population-
based genetic attacker is implemented to search
for perturbations that lead to misclassification from
the model. Given an original or modified sentence,
the attacker randomly substitutes a word from the
sentence with a new one based on the perturba-
tion mechanism satisfying metric DP. After mul-
tiple substitutions, the attacker obtains a popula-
tion of new sentences together with their fitness
scores (negatively proportional to the probability
predicted for the correct label).
If the new sentence with the highest fitness score
successfully fools the model, then the attacker
moves forward to the next sentence and starts a
new round of testing. Otherwise, the attacker will
perform crossover and mutation operations: sample
two new sentences as parents from the population
according to their fitness score, and then generate
the child sentence by taking the word from either
parent randomly. Another round of perturbation
over the child sentence is then performed to further
increase sentence diversity. The model is certified
robust to after providing correct predictions over a
predefined numbers of attacks.
6.4 Evaluation Metrics
Based on attributes of the testing set, different met-
rics are utilized to evaluate models’ performance.
• Clean Accuracy: the percentage of correct pre-
dictions when testing on the original samples.
• Adversarial Accuracy: percent of correct pre-
dictions when testing on perturbed samples.
6.5 Privacy Statistics of Metric DP
Mechanisms
In the context of privacy preservation, plausible de-
niability measures the likelihood of making correct
inference given a sample perturbed by the privacy
mechanism. Following (Feyisetan et al., 2020),
the following statistics are recorded to empirically
evaluate the plausible deniability of the metric DP
mechanisms at different values of  (over 1, 000
experiment runs):
• Nw, measures the probability that a word does
not get modified by the mechanism. This is ap-
proximated by counting the number of times
an input word w does not get replaced after
running the mechanism 1, 000 times.
• Sw, which is the number of distinct words that
are produced as the output of M(w). This
is approximated by counting the number of
distinct substitutions for an input word w after
running the mechanism 1, 000 times.
Plausible Deniability Analysis (Q1) In Fig. 1,
we observe similar trends on the two privacy statis-
tic measures for both datasets. When samples are
perturbed by the multivariate Laplace mechanism
(shown in Fig. 1a and Fig. 1b), the number of dis-
tinct substitutions Sw decreases from 1, 000 to 0
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(d) Truncated Gumbel Perturbation Mechanism on SNLI
Figure 1: Empirical Sw and Nw statistics of Multivariate Laplace Mechanism and Truncated Gumbel Perturbation
Mechanism on vocabularies from IMDb and SNLI. The average amount of the two measures is plotted as curves
while the standard deviation is represented by shadows along the curve. Same plot patterns (curve and shadow)
represent the same meaning (mean± std) in the following figures.
while the the times of maintaining the original word
Nw shows the opposite trend. The empirical values
of the two measures are consistent with the defi-
nition of metric DP that the multivariate Laplace
mechanisms satisfies i.e.,:  → 0 provides abso-
lute privacy as the output produced by the mecha-
nism becomes independent of the input word, while
→∞ results in null privacy where M(w) = w.
There are two main differences between trun-
cated Gumbel (demonstrated in Fig. 1c and Fig. 1d)
and multivariate Laplace mechanism in privacy
statistics: 1) minor increase or decrease in  does
not influence word substitutions produced by trun-
cated Gumbel, hence variation of Sw and Nw is
plotted against the logarithm value of ; 2) due
to the effects of word substitutions among the top
k closest words in the vocabulary, the maximum
amount of distinct substitutions one word can have
is around 20 on IMDB and 17.5 on SNLI.
Word Substitution Range Analysis (Q2) One
main advantage of the proposed truncated Gumbel
perturbation mechanism over the existing multivari-
ate Laplace mechanism relies on the top-k closest
words as substitutions, which helps preserve word
semantics and improve utility of downstream ML
tasks for words located in dense area of the em-
bedding space. To show this property, we compare
the amount of distinct word substitutions Sw when
the times of keeping the word unchanged Nw is
fixed in Fig 2. We discover that when different
mechanisms result in the same perturbation effects,
the multivariate Laplace mechanism has a much
broader range of word substitutions compared with
the proposed truncated Gumbel mechanism, which
will probably raise problems in semantic preserva-
tion and result in poor performance on downstream
tasks trained on the perturbed dataset.
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Figure 2: Word substitution range comparison (lower
Sw is better when Nw is fixed). Due to the different
scales of Sw by the two mechanisms, the y-axis indi-
cates the log value of Sw for better visualization.
6.6 Model Robustness Against Metric DP
Adversarial Samples (Q3)
We list performance of the two adversarial train-
ing approaches when samples are perturbed by the
multivariate Laplace mechanism in Table 3 and the
Table 2: Performance of adversarial training approaches on Text Data with(out) perturbations from truncated
gumbel perturbation mechanism. Note that results are recorded when log  = 4.67 for IMDb and log  = 4.52
for SNLI, which are slightly larger than their respective lower bounds on .
log 
4.67/
4.52 10.00 14.00 17.00 23.00 38.00 50.00 62.00 74.00 86.00
IMDb
Clean IBP 81.00 81.00 81.00 81.00 81.00 81.00 81.00 81.00 81.00 81.00
Aug 89.80 89.60 88.10 90.00 88.30 89.20 89.00 89.40 89.80 89.70
Adv IBP 35.30 34.60 47.40 58.60 70.90 79.90 80.80 80.90 80.90 81.00
Aug 32.00 34.90 43.30 60.20 71.80 86.20 88.80 89.30 89.70 89.70
SNLI
Clean IBP 79.19 79.19 79.19 79.19 79.19 79.19 79.19 79.19 79.19 79.19
Aug 78.89 79.92 81.32 81.74 81.77 82.20 82.18 81.86 81.65 81.96
Adv IBP 12.5 11.49 12.98 14.95 24.01 58.78 74.51 78.18 78.88 79.12
Aug 21.05 17.34 16.57 17.05 23.96 58.58 76.54 80.62 81.41 81.90
truncated Gumbel mechanism in Table 2.
In Table 3, clean accuracy of the proposed aug-
mented training approach is approximately 8.74%
higher than that of the certifiably robust trained ap-
proach IBP for any  selection on IMDb and 3.33%
higher for  ≥ 40 on SNLI. Retraining with adver-
sarial examples helps maintain the similar level of
clean accuracy as the normal training approach,
which is consistent with observations in litera-
ture (Jia and Liang, 2017; Iyyer et al., 2018; Ribeiro
et al., 2018; Belinkov and Bisk, 2017; Ebrahimi
et al., 2017). When evaluating the model’s robust-
ness against word perturbations from the multivari-
ate Laplace mechanism, the augmented training
outperforms the IBP approach only when the 
value is larger than some threshold, e.g.,  > 150
on IMDb and  > 60 on SNLI. This is expected
as the augmented training cannot protect against
all attacks especially when small values of  re-
sults in any word substitution without considering
semantic-preserving. In this case, the model can
hardly learn the hidden relationship between the
corrupted new texts and the original text label.
Given better semantic-preserving capability in-
herent in the proposed truncated Gumbel mech-
anism, the augmented training approach outper-
forms the certifiably robust trained IBP method in
both clean and adversarial accuracy almost for any
tested  value tested. In Table 2, improvement of
clean accuracy by the augmented training approach
over IBP is 9.87% on IMDb and 3.77% on SNLI
when log  = 50. At the same time, better per-
formance against adversarial attacks is achieved
by the augmented training approach: 9.90% higher
adversarial accuracy on IMDb and 2.72% on SNLI.
One possible explanation of the inferior adver-
sarial accuracy achieved by the certified defense
approach IBP may be attributed to the training pro-
cedure, which is based on the word substitutions
that preserve semantic meanings (Alzantot et al.,
2018). However, the testing adversarial examples
are generated by randomized perturbations from
metric DP mechanisms, where the semantic mean-
ing is not always preserved, but dynamically deter-
mined by the privacy parameter .
7 Discussion and Conclusion
We study the performance of different adversarial
training approaches against adversarial examples
generated by metric DP mechanisms. To better
preserve semantic meanings during word perturba-
tions, we propose a novel truncated Gumbel mech-
anism, which formally satisfies metric DP (see Ap-
pendix A). Empirically experiments demonstrate
the advantage of the truncated Gumbel mechanism
over the existing multivariate Laplace mechanism
due to its smaller range of substitution candidates.
In two textual classification tasks, retraining with
adversarial examples performs better than the certi-
fied defence in both clean and adversarial accuracy.
We think the following aspects are interesting
and deserve more investigations in the future: 1)
robustness of other adversarial training approaches
based on the metric DP-inspired adversarial exam-
ples, e.g., surrogate-loss minimization; 2) gener-
alization capability of the well-trained augmented
training approach, e.g., performance against other
types of adversarial examples; 3) privacy preserva-
tion performance of the proposed truncated gumbel
mechanism, e.g., performance of membership in-
ference attacks (MIA) on perturbed texts.
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A Privacy Proof for Truncated Gumbel
Mechanism
Theorem 1. The truncated Gumbel perturbation
mechanism, defined in Algorithm 2, is dχ-private
with respect to the Euclidean metric.
Proof. We first show for any pairs of substitutable
words w and w’,
Pr[M(w) = ui|K = n]
Pr(M(w′) = ui|K = n] ≤ exp
[
2
b
e
2
b
∆d(w,w′)
]
,
where n = |W| and d(w,w′) = ‖φ(w)− φ(w′)‖2.
Conditional on K = n,
Pr(M(w) = ui|K = n) = Pr(di+gi < min
j 6=i
dj+gj).
Since g1, . . . , gn are i.i.d. random variables, we
argue for each i independently. Fix g−i =
[g1, . . . , gi−1, gi+1, . . . , gn] as a random draw from
n − 1 independent Gumbel distributions. Define
g∗ = sup g : di + g < minj 6=i dj + gj . Then
gi < minj 6=i(dj + gj)− di if and only if gi ≤ g∗,
which means M(w) = ui if and only if gi ≤ g∗.
Now consider another substitutable word w′ with
a corresponding distance vector d′ = [d′1, . . . , d′n].
By triangle inequality, we have
|di − d′i| ≤ d(w,w′), for i = 1, . . . . , n.
Therefore,
Pr(M(w′) = ui|K = n)
= Pr(d′i + gi < min
j 6=i
(d′j + gj))
= Pr(gi < min
j 6=i
(d′j + gj)− d′i)
= Pr(gi < min
j 6=i
(dj + gj)− di + 2d(w,w′)
= Pr(gi ≤ g∗ + 2d(w,w′)).
Therefore,
Pr(M(w) = ui|K = n)
Pr(M(w′) = ui|K = n)
≥ Pr(gi ≤ g
∗)
Pr(gi ≤ g∗ + 2d(w,w′))
=
exp(−e− 1b g∗)
exp(−e− 1b g∗− 2b d(w,w′))
= exp[−e− 1b g∗(1− e− 2b d(w,w′))],
which is increasing in g∗ as 1 − e− 2b d(w,w′) > 0.
Since g∗ ≥ −2∆, and then
Pr(M(w) = ui|K = n)
Pr(M(w′) = ui|K = n)
≥ exp(−e− 1b (−2∆)(1− e− 2b d(w,w′)))
≥ exp
[
−e 2b∆ · 2
b
d(w,w′)
]
.
By symmetry of w and w′, we also have
Pr(M(w) = ui|K = n)
Pr(M(w′) = ui|K = n) ≤ exp
[
2
b
e
2
b
∆d(w,w′)
]
.
Recall that K ∼ TruncatedPoisson (λ; 1, n).
We want to show an upper bound for Pr(M(w)=ui)Pr(M(w′)=ui) ,
which is
Pr(M(w) = ui)
Pr(M(w′) = ui)
=
∑n
k=1 Pr(M(w) = ui|K = k) Pr(K = k)∑n
k=1 Pr(M(w
′) = ui|K = k) Pr(K = k)
≤
∑n
k=1 Pr(M(w) = ui|K = k) Pr(K = k)
Pr(M(w′) = ui|K = n) Pr(K = n)
≤n− 1 + Pr(M(w) = ui|K = n) Pr(K = n)
Pr(M(w′) = ui|K = n) Pr(K = n) ,
Since
Pr(M(w) = ui|K = n) = exp(−e− 1b g∗)
≥ exp(−e 2∆b ),
and Pr(K = n) ≥ e−λ (from Definition 1),
Pr(M(w) = ui)
Pr(M(w′) = ui)
≤ exp
(
2
b
e
2
b
∆d(w,w′)
)(
1 +
n− 1
exp(−e 2∆b − λ)
)
=
(
1 + (n− 1)ee
2∆
b +λ
)
exp
(
2
b
e
2
b
∆d(w,w′)
)
≤2n exp(e 2∆b + λ) exp
(
2
b
e
2
b
∆d(w,w′)
)
In order to guarantee  dχ-privacy, we solve for
b using
ed(w,w
′) ≥ 2n exp(e 2∆b +λ) exp
(
2
b
e
2
b
∆d(w,w′)
)
.
Taking logarithm on both sides,
 ≥ 1
d(w,w′)
loge
(
2n exp(e
2∆
b + λ)
)
+
2
b
e
2
b
∆,
so we need to find an upper bound for the right-
hand side of the equation as a function of b.
1
d(w,w′)
loge
(
2n exp(e
2∆
b + λ)
)
+
2
b
e
2
b
∆
≤ 1
∆0
(
2 + log n+ e
2∆
b + λ
)
+
2
b
e
2
b
∆
=
2 + log n+ λ
∆0
+
(
1
∆0
+
2
b
)
e
2
b
∆,
which is decreasing in b. When b ≤ ∆0,
2 + log n+ λ
∆0
+
(
1
∆0
+
2
b
)
e
2
b
∆
≤2 + log n+ λ
∆0
+
3
b
e
2
b
∆,
it is sufficient to set
b =
2∆
W
(
2∆
3
(
− 2+logn+λ∆0
)) ,
where W is Lambert-W function. When b > ∆0,
2 + log n+ λ
∆0
+
(
1
∆0
+
2
b
)
e
2
b
∆
≤2 + log n+ λ
∆0
+
3
∆0
e
2
b
∆,
it is sufficient to set
b =
2∆
loge
(
∆0
3
(
− 2+logn+λ∆0
)) .
Thus, a sufficient condition for
 ≥ 1
d(w,w′)
loge
(
2n exp(e
2∆
b + λ)
)
+
2
b
e
2
b
∆,
is to set b to be
max
(
2∆
W
(
2∆
3
(
− 2+logn+λ∆0
)) ,
2∆
loge
(
∆0
3
(
− 2+logn+λ∆0
))).
Now that we have proved the proposed mecha-
nism M is  dχ-private with respect to Euclidean
metric d on a string of one word, we have for any
pair of inputs w,w′ ∈ W` and any output u ∈ W`,
Pr(M(w) = u)
Pr(M(w′) = u)
=
∏`
i=1
(
Pr(M(wi) = ui)
Pr(M(w′i) = ui)
)
≤
∏`
i=1
exp(d(wi, w
′
i)) = exp(d(w,w
′)),
where d(w,w′) =
∑`
i=1 d(wi, w
′
i).
For Algorithm 2, we set λ = log |W|, so that the
value of b used is the following:
b = max
(
2∆
W
(
2∆
3
(
− 2+2 log |W|∆0
)) ,
2∆
loge
(
∆0
3
(
− 2+2 log |W|∆0
)))
For this value of b to be defined, we must ensure
that  is set in a way that the logarithm and Lambert-
W function in the denominator has a positive argu-
ment. This holds whenever the following is true:
 >
2 (1 + log |W|)
∆0
.
For IMDB dataset, we have |W| = 48210, and
that for the SNLI dataset is |W| = 11673. Using
∆0 = 0.2208 and 0.2263 for IMDB and SNLI,
respectively, the lower bounds for  we obtain are
106.73 and 91.604, respectively.
B Fraction of Modified Words
Lemma 1. For given  > 0, string x = w1 . . . w`
and any fixed k, the expected fraction of words
that get modified using Algorithm 2 is at least
(1 − p), where p = exp
(
−e− 2∆b
)
. In particular,
E(Nw) ≤ p|W|.
Proof. Fix a word wi ∈ x. Since u1 = wi,
observe that we can write the probability that
it does not get modified as Pr (w˜i = u1) =
Pr (g1 < minj≥2 (dj + gj)). Let g∗1 = sup g :
g < minj≥2 (dj + gj). Then, similar to the proof
of Theorem 1, g1 < minj≥2 (dj + gj) if and
only if g1 ≤ g∗1 . This gives Pr (w˜i = u1) =
Pr (g1 ≤ g∗1) = exp
(−e−g∗1/b). Since g∗1 ≤ 2∆,
we can write Pr (w˜i = u1) ≤ exp
(
−e− 2∆b
)
.
Thus, the expected fraction of words in x that
do not get modified is at most p, where p =
exp
(− exp (−2∆b )). From this, we compute the
expected fraction of words that get modified as at
least (1− p), as desired. The bound on E(Nw) fol-
lows from a simple union bound over all the words
in the vocabulary.
Note that ∂p∂b =
∂
∂b exp
(
−e− 2∆b
)
< 0, and
hence, p is a decreasing function in b, implying
that as the privacy increases (b increases), the value
of E(Nw) decreases, as expected.
C Utility Analysis vs. Sparsity of the
Embedding Space
We want to analyze how word substitution works
for Gumbel vs. Laplace for different embedding
densities. Given a word w ∈ W in the vocabulary,
we let δ(w) = minw′∈W
w 6=w′
d(w,w′) denote the dis-
tance to the closest word to w in the embedding
space. For the same value of , let nLap ∼ Lap
(
2

)
be the amount of Laplace noise added to perturb the
word, and pLap(w) be the probability that the event
ξw : arg minw′∈W
(||w′ − (w + nLap) ||2) = w
(i.e. the word remains unchanged). Then, we can
compute this probability as follows:
pLap(w) = Pr (ξw) = Pr
(||nLap||2 < δ(w)/2)
= 2
∫ δ(w)/2
0

4
e−x/2dx
=
∫ δ(w)/4
0
e−ydy = 1− e
(
− δ(w)
4
)
.
Thus, as δ(w) increases (the sparsity around w
increases), so does pLap(w), implying that under
Laplace mechanism, words inside the sparse re-
gions of the embedding space tend to stay un-
changed. However, when δ(w) approaches 0
(denser regions), the probability pLap(w) vanishes.
For such regions,w will get modified with probabil-
ity approaching one, which can potentially reduce
utility.
For the same amount of , the Truncated Gumbel
mechanism keeps w unchanged when the noise
added to w is smaller than any other perturbed
candidate. If pGum(w) is the probability that w
does not change under this perturbation, then we
can write the following:
pGum(w) ≥ Pr (g1 < δ(w) + g2) Pr(K ≥ 2)
= Pr (g1 − g2 < δ(w)) Pr(K ≥ 2)
Since the difference of two i.i.d. Gumbel random
variables follows a Logistic distribution, we obtain
the following (by letting Gb ∼ Logistic (0, b)):
pGum(w) ≥ Pr (Gb < δ(w)) Pr(K ≥ 2)
=
(
1
1 + e−δ(w)/b
)
Pr(K ≥ 2)
≥ e−e−δ(w)/b Pr(K ≥ 2),
where, the last inequality follows since 1 + x ≤
ex. Thus, even when δ(w) approaches 0 (denser
regions), there is at least pGum(w)|δ(w)→0 ≥
Pr(K≥2)
e =
1
e
(
1− log |W|
e|W|
) |W|→∞−−−−−→ 36.7% prob-
ability that w remains unchanged. This helps pre-
serve utility by ensuring that the modified word is
likely to be closer to the original word since there
is a significant probability mass around the original
word (specially as |W| increases).
Table 3: Performance of adversarial training approaches on Text Data with(out) perturbations from multivariate
Laplace mechanism. The clean accuracy of normal training is 89.50% on IMDB and 82.68% on SNLI. The
accuracy from one model higher than that achieved by the other model in the same setting is marked by boldface.
 1 5 9 20 40 60 80 100 150 200
IMDB
Clean
IBP 81.00 81.00 81.00 81.00 81.00 81.00 81.00 81.00 81.00 81.00
Aug 88.22 88.20 87.34 87.38 88.60 88.74 88.12 88.46 88.00 87.76
Adv
IBP 0.30 0.50 1.20 4.90 38.60 68.30 78.50 80.30 80.90 81.00
Aug 10.80 8.50 10.20 6.90 9.50 17.70 32.10 53.00 80.50 88.30
SNLI
Clean
IBP 79.19 79.19 79.19 79.19 79.19 79.19 79.19 79.19 79.19 79.19
Aug 76.68 77.28 77.07 78.08 81.38 81.79 81.75 81.91 82.17 82.00
Adv
IBP 1.84 1.90 2.21 3.70 9.22 24.19 46.62 64.92 78.73 79.16
Aug 2.44 2.61 3.01 4.20 9.14 24.08 46.94 66.54 81.44 81.94
